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Abstract: This	paper	examines	the	development	of	international	financial	centres	(IFC)	in	Central	
and	Eastern	Europe	(CEE).	The	study	argues	that	the	development	of	the	financial	services	in	CEE	
is	characterized	by	external	dependency,	which	is	manifested	in	the	form	of	hierarchical	command	
and	control	functions	over	CEE	financial	subsidiaries	within	the	West	European	IFC	network.	The	
paper	quantitatively	compares	the	factors	of	IFC	functions	of	Budapest	in	comparison	to	those	of	
Warsaw	and	Prague.	It	argues	that	despite	the	lack	of	market	evidence	showing	signs	of	a	regional-
centre	focus	during	the	transition	period,	there	are	some	signs	of	IFC	formation.	The	paper	assesses	
the	uneven	impact	of	the	global	economic	crisis	upon	CEE	financial	centres	and	confirms	that	their	
development	trajectories	became	more	differentiated	as	a	result	of	the	crisis.	The	steady	decline	of	
Budapest	during	the	second	half	of	the	2000s	was	accompanied	by	the	rise	of	Warsaw.	Our	analysis	
concluded	that	Budapest,	despite	its	earlier	endeavours,	most	likely	lost	the	competition	to	become	
an	international	financial	centre.	
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rozWój międzynarodoWych centróW finansoWych 
W europie ŚrodkoWej i Wschodniej W okresie 
tRanSFoRmacji i kryzysu. przykład Budapesztu
Streszczenie:	 Autor	 analizuje	 rozwój	 międzynarodowych	 centrów	 finansowych	 w	 Europie	
Środkowo-Wschodniej	(EŚW).	Badania	pokazały,	że	rozwój	usług	finansowych	w	krajach	EŚW	
charakteryzuje	zależność	zewnętrzna,	gdyż	tamtejsze	filie	firm	o	tym	profilu	są	kontrolowane	przez	
centrale	zlokalizowane	w	krajach	Europy	Zachodniej.	Autor	porównuje	w	ujęciu	ilościowym	stopień	
rozwoju	 funkcji	 finansowych	w	Budapeszcie,	Warszawie	 i	 Pradze.	Dowodzi,	 że	 pomimo	braku	
wyraźnych	przejawów	tworzenia	międzynarodowych	centrów	finansowych	w	okresie	transformacji	
można	 obecnie	 dostrzec	 sygnały	 świadczące	 o	 powstawaniu	 takich	 centrów.	 Czytelnicy	 znajdą	
w	artykule	ocenę	wpływu	światowego	kryzysu	gospodarczego	na	centra	finansowe	w	krajach	EŚW	
i	potwierdzenie	wzrostu	zróżnicowania	trajektorii	ich	rozwoju.	W	szczególności	obserwowany	był	
stały	spadek	znaczenia	Budapesztu	pod	tym	względem,	szczególnie	pod	koniec	pierwszej	dekady	
XXI	w.,	któremu	towarzyszył	jednoczesny	wzrost	roli	Warszawy.	Zoltán	Gál	zaznacza	na	koniec,	
że	Budapeszt,	pomimo	wcześniejszych	osiągnięć,	najprawdopodobniej	przegrał	konkurencję	jako	
międzynarodowe	centrum	finansowe.
Słowa kluczowe:	 międzynarodowe	 centra	 finansowe,	 kraje	 Europy	 Środkowo-Wschodniej,	
transformacja	postsocjalistyczna,	bezpośrednie	inwestycje	zagraniczne,	kryzys	gospodarczy.
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 Introduction 
Global	 financial	 capital	 has	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 all	 transition	
economies.	Foreign	direct	investment	in	the	banking	sector	is	closely	connected	
to	the	transition	process	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	(CEE)	and	has	received	
considerable	 attention	 from	 both	 a	 theoretical	 and	 an	 empirical	 perspective.	
However,	much	 less	 attention	 has	 been	 devoted	 to	 the	major	 determinants	 of	
international	 financial	 centre	 (IFC)	 formation	within	 the	 ‘de-nationalised	 dual	
banking	system’	of	CEE	(Gál,	2014).
During	the	last	three	decades	the	financial	services	industry	has	experienced	
major	transformations	in	which	the	largest	market	players,	instiutions,	and	global	
hubs,	namely	IFCs,	have	gained	importance.	Although	market	activity	is	spreading	
to	new	corners	of	the	world,	a	powerful	process	of	centralization	is	reinforcing	
the	 traditional	dominance	of	financial	 capitals,	 led	by	London	and	New	York,	
and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 by	 second	 and	 third	 tier	 international	 financial	 centres	
(Faulconbridge	et	al.,	2007;	Engelen	and	Grote,	2009;	Gál,	2010a).	Despite	the	
growing	body	of	literature	(Grote,	2008;	Engelen,	2007;	Wójcik,	2007;	Boschma	
and	Ledder,	 2010;	Zademach	 and	Musil,	 2012)	 on	 the	 development	 of	 global	
financial	centres,	very	little	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	evolution	of	financial	
centres	 in	peripheral	or	emerging	 regions	 (Poon,	2003,	Karreman	and	van	der	
Knaap,	2009;	Zhao	et	al.,	2013)	
Despite	the	geographic	dispersal	of	financial	services,	the	increased	importance	
of	 central	 coordination	 and	 control	 functions	 is	 the	 main	 characteristics	 of	
IFCs.	A	financial	centre	is	defined	as	a	large	city	with	an	agglomeration	of	the	
headquarters	 of	 the	 largest	 financial	 firms	 providing	 all	 banking	 and	 financial	
services,	nationally	or	internationally	(Porteous,	1999;	Cassis,	2010).	The	term	
is	used	for	strategic	urban	locations	where	the	financial	sector	plays	a	dominant	
role	 in	 the	 local	and/or	global	economy,	as	measured	by	 the	share	of	financial	
services	in	national	income,	GDP,	or	in	total	employment,	and	by	the	presence	of	
foreign	banks.	Apparently,	financial	sector	agglomeration	reflects	and	reinforces	
‘real	 economy’	concentrations,	 as	firms	 tend	 to	agglomerate	 similarly	 to	other	
advanced	producer	service	providers	in	order	to	achieve	the	location	advantages	
of	urbanization	economies	(Porteous,	1999).	Financial	centres	can	be	classified,	
in	 terms	 of	 their	 geographic	 influence,	 as	 national,	 regional	 (international	
functions	with	macro-regional	 scope),	 and	 global	 centres	 (Zhao	 et	 al.,	 2004).	
A	global	centre	is	defined	as	a	city	with	a	strong	presence	of	a	wide	variety	of	
financial	players	(investors,	brokers,	securities	firms,	investment	banks,	etc.)	with	
extensive	international	activities,	while	the	domestic	centre	is	dominated	by	firms	
with	a	domestic	scope	of	operations.	
These	 international	 financial	 centres,	 which	 are	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 global	
cities,	have	developed	a	dense	network	of	linkages,	and	provide	a	full-spectrum	
of	advanced	producer	services.	Most	of	the	major	international	financial	centres	
are	 also	world	 cities	 (Sassen,	 2004;	Taylor,	 2004).	These	 global	 centres	 have	
massive	 concentration	 of	 resources	 that	 allow	 them	 to	maximize	 the	 benefits	
of	 information	 and	 connectivity,	 with	 other	 centres	 generating	 asymmetric	
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power	 relations	 executed	 through	 their	 affiliates,	which	 are	 the	 key	mediators	
of	their	command	and	control	functions.	Key	social	and	information-generating	
processes	occurring	in	IFCs,	such	as	face-to-face	contact,	are	facilitated	by	a	high	
degree	 of	 social	 proximity.	 IFCs	 are	 also	 a	 gateway	 for	 financial	 services	 for	
other	 lower	 tier	 centres.	 The	 emergence	 of	 IFCs	 depends	 on	 several	 factors,	
among	 which	 the	 most	 important	 are:	 (1)	 the	 size	 of	 the	 domestic	 economy,	
(2)	 the	 information	 hinterland,	 and	 (3)	 path	 dependence	 (Cassis,	 2011).	 Scale	
economies,	 together	with	 the	diversity	of	 the	financial	 sector,	 are	a	key	 factor	
explaining	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 financial	 centre.	The	 concept	 of	 an	 information	
hinterland	defines	a	geographical	area	for	which	the	financial	centre	provides	an	
ideal	access	point	 for	 the	exploitation	of	valuable	 information	flows.	The	path	
dependence	approach	refers	 to	a	historical	 incidence	that	would	have	long-run	
cumulative	consequences	in	the	evolution	of	financial	centres	(David,	1988).	The	
development	trajectories	of	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	financial	centres,	
as	well	as	 the	 impact	of	 the	economic	crisis,	are	 likely	 to	differ	 from	those	of	
higher-rank	international	financial	centres.	
Central	and	Eastern	European	finnacial	centres	are	neglected	from	this	point	
of	 view,	 and	Karreman’s	 (2009)	 or	Wójcik’s	 (2007)	 studies	 on	 contemporary	
financial	geographies	of	Eastern	Europe	do	not	provide	a	detailed	overview	of	
the	 development	 of	financial	 centers,	 and	do	not	 consider	 the	 development	 of	
IFCs’	functions	in	the	region.	Despite	its	re-integration	processes	into	the	global	
financial	markets,	little	attention	has	been	directed	towards	the	development	of	
financial	centres	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	This	paper	examines	the	financial	
centre	function	of	Budapest	in	comparison	to	those	of	Warsaw	and	Prague,	two	
other	significant	financial	centres	in	the	contemporary	CEE	region,	and	how	they	
are	integrated	into	the	network	of	established	European	financial	centres.	As	the	
development	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 in	 European	 emerging	markets	 is	 largely	
dependent	 on	 foreign	 investments,	 explicit	 attention	 is	 directed	 to	 determine	
which	 CEE	 centres	 exhibit	 sufficient	 power	 to	 attract	 multinational	 financial	
service	firms	 and	 develop	 certain	 international	 functions.	The	 paper	 examines	
whether	the	concentration	of	command	and	control	functions	over	CEE	within	
the	Western	 European	 IFC	 network	make	 it	 possible	 to	 develop	 paralell	 IFC	
function	in	CEE	capital	cities.	
The	 paper	 explores	 the	 international	 financial	 centre	 function	 of	 Budapest	
relative	to	Warsaw	and	Prague,	assessing	the	preconditions	(including	the	main	
indicators	of	banking	&	capital	markets)	for	the	creation	of	a	regional	centre.	It	
presents	the	requirements	for	the	formation	of	an	IFC	and	discusses	arguments	
about	 the	 ongoing	 competition	 among	 the	 CEE	metropolises.	 The	 paper	 also	
raises	 the	question	of	whether	 the	CEECs	need	 to	develop	 their	 own	 regional	
financial	centres,	or	whether	they	could	instead	rely	on	existing	‘western’	IFCs.	
This	study	also	examines	the	impact	of	the	recent	global	economic	crisis	on	the	
future	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	financial	centres.	This	raises	the	question	
of	cross-border	financial	exposures	and	the	related	risks	of	financial	contagion,	
as	well	as	of	asymmetric	shifts	in	capital	flows	between	West	European	and	CEE	
financial	centres	during	the	crisis.	
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From	the	methodological	point	of	view,	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	data	
have	been	collected.	Primary	data	 is	collected	 from	national	 statistical	offices,	
central	 banks,	 and	 private	 financial	 firms’	 reports	 (Raiffeisen	 CEE	 Banking	
Reports),	as	well	as	from	the	websites	of	international	financial	organizations	(e.g.	
Bank	of	International	Settlements,	World	Federation	of	Exchanges).	We	also	used	
consultancy	firms’	reports.	With	regard	to	the	development	of	the	financial	centre	
functions	of	Budapest,	expert	interviews	were	conducted	with	the	stakeholders	of	
the	Hungarian	banking	sector	and	policy	makers	in	2007.
The	paper	is	organised	as	follows:	the	first	section	summarises	the	impact	of	
transformation	on	IFC	formation.	The	second	section	examines	the	development	
of	the	international	financial	centre	function	of	Budapest,	as	compared	to	Warsaw	
and	 Prague,	 assessing	 the	 preconditions	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 regional	 centre	
transition	using	quantitative	indicators.	The	third	section	asseses	 the	 impact	of	
the	global	crisis	on	Central	and	Eastern	European	financial	centres.	Finally,	in	the	
concluding	section,	key	findings	are	summarised.	
Impact of transition on the formation of International Financial Centres 
Since	 the	 early	 1990s	 CEE	 countries	 went	 through	 fundamental	 political,	
economic,	 and	 institutional	 transitions	 on	 the	 way	 from	 a	 centrally	 planned	
economic	 model	 to	 an	 open	 market	 economy.	 Structural	 adjustments	 were	
accompanied	by	the	rapid	internationalization	and	re-integration	of	CEE	countries	
into	the	global	economy,	and	later	–	by	European	integration	and	accession	into	
the	European	Union.	
Most	 of	 the	 literature	 studying	 the	 transition	 process	 has	 described	 the	
transformation	 and	 the	 (re)-integration	 of	 the	 region	 into	 the	 global	 capitalist	
system	as	a	linear	convergence	with	the	advanced	market	economies,	following	
the	 path	 of	 liberalization	 and	 privatization.	 However,	 there	 is	 considerable	
diversity	among	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries,	due	to	their	different	
legacies,	varieties	of	implemented	transformation	models,	and	economic	policies	
(Sokol,	 2001).1	 The	 crisis	 further	 strengthened	 these	 different	 developmental	
trends,	resulting	in	diverging	economies	and	regions	within	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe.
Concerning	 IFC	 formations	 there	were	 three	 parallel	 processes,	 namely	 the	
post-socialist transition, financialization, and world-city formation,	 which	 not	
only	 accompanied	 but	 also	 influenced	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 development	 of	
financial	centers	explored	in	this	study.	
The post-socialist transition	was	characterised	by	external	pressure	from	the	
intertwined	virtues	of	neoliberalism,	foreign	capital,	and	international	institutions	
(e.g.	 IMF).	 The	 international	 situation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 which	 the	 change	 of	
1	 Sokol	 (2001)	 puts	 the	CEE	 transition	 into	 the	 context	 of	 the	 centre-periphery	model	 and	
divides	 the	 regions	by	different	 subregions:	 ‘Super-periphery	A’	 (ECE	and	Baltic	 states)	 have	
a	more	solid	economic	structure,	legacy	of	modernization,	and	more	experience	with	market	and	
political	 democracy.	 In	 ‘Super-periphery	B’	 (former	Soviet	Union)	 countries,	 liberal-capitalist	
economic	and	political	structures	were	relatively	underdeveloped.	
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regime	was	to	take	place	in	CEE	was	crucially	shaped	by	two	major	currents	of	
the	twentieth	century,	namely,	globalisation and (neoliberal) economic paradigm 
change.	 These	 developments	 not	 only	 contributed	 to	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Soviet	
bloc,	 they	 also	 created	 rather	 strict	 economic	 conditions	 for	 post-communist	
countries	about	to	reintegrate	into	the	global	market	economy.	In	the	course	of	
this	 transition,	CEE	countries	had	 to	adjust	 to	 the modus operandi	 of	 a	world	
economy	 fraught	 by	 shocks	 and	 uncertainties	 (debt	 crisis,	money	market	 and	
currency	 crises),	 driven	by	 competition,	which	 could	 sometimes	be	 extremely	
disadvantageous.	 The	 forerunners	 of	 economic	 transition,	 like	 Hungary,	 were	
exceptionally	vulnerable	and	had	to	act	as	an	experimental	ground	for	the	dominant	
interests	of	foreign	capital	(Gazsó	and	Laki,	2004).	According	to	Gowan’s	(1995)	
view,	the	transition,	and	especially	the	‘shock	therapy’	approach,	was	designed	
to	 allow	Western	 capital	 to	 conquer	 the	Eastern	European	markets,	 to	 capture	
cheap	production	lines	and	create	dependent	West-East	economic	relations.	As	
a	result,	the	chief	characteristics	of	this	blend	of	‘outer	directed	capitalism’	or	the	
‘dependent	market	economy’	model	(DME)	included	a	relatively	fast	recovery	
from	the	transformation	crisis	but	also	a	dominant	role	of	foreign	capital	in	the	
process	of	stabilisation (Szelényi	et	al.,	2000). 
Although	there	is	no	single	indicator	of	international	integration,	the	transition	
process	 is	 heavily	 influenced	by	dependence	on	 foreign	financial	 inflows,	 and	
generally	by	 the	high	 level	of financialization (Myant	and	Drahokupil,	2012).	
Foreign	Direct	 Investment	 (FDI)	 inflow	 into	CEE	economies	 has	 been	 a	 vital	
factor	 in	the	first	stage	of	privatisation,	and	FDI	became	the	predominant	 type	
of	 incoming	 capital	 investment	 in	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 economic	 transition.	
The	banking	and	insurance	sectors	were	the	primary	targets	of	strategic	foreign	
investors,	 resulting	 in	 significant	 inflows	 of	 FDI	 into	 these	 sectors,	 connected	
mainly	 to	 the	 privatisation	 of	 state-owned	 banks.	 The	 other	 forms	 of	 foreign	
capital	inflows	were	also	important	in	many	countries	of	the	CEE	region.	Indebted	
states	(Hungary,	Balticum)	inherited	or	generated	larger	debts,	and	due	to	their	
‘fiscal	alcoholism,’	they	remained	dependent	on	foreign	investors	in	public	debt	
financing.	Other	 forms	 of	 private	 flows,	 such	 as	 equity	 investment,	 increased	
as	the	local	blue	chip	companies	started	to	attract	more	foreign	capital	through	
revitalised	 local	 stock	exchanges.	The	most	 important	 form	of	financialization	
was	driven	by	an	increase	in	domestic	consumption	credit.	
The network of world cities was another	determining	factor	for	the	formation	
of	IFCs	in	the	1990s. The	rapid	integration	of	economies	through	the	structural	
effects	of	globalisation	on	production,	financial	transactions,	and	wealth	creation	
have	also	stimulated	 the	 formation of world cities (Lo	and	Yeung,	1998).	This	
is	 also	 accompanied	 by	 an	 unprecedented	 concentration	 of	 new	 tertiary	 and	
quaternary	activities,	such	as	various	forms	of	financial	and	advanced	producer	
services	(Bourdeau-Lepage	and	Huriot,	2003,	2005).	It	is	therefore	not	accidental	
that	 the	Globalization	and	World	City	Network’s	approach	ranked	world	cities	
on	the	basis	of	the	concentration	of	advanced	producer	services	(Taylor,	2004).	
The	process	of	globalization,	defined	as	increasing	the	cross-border	integration	
of	economic	activities,	is	enhancing	interlinkages	and	interdependencies	among	
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major	cities	located	around	the	globe.	The	process	of	the	formation	of	world	cities	
impinges	upon	the	transformation	of	the	structural	and	functional	role	of	these	
cities,	focusing	on	the	role	of	command	and	control	activities	(Sassen,	2004).	
In	 this	 regard,	 pressures	 of	 globalization,	 particularly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 city	
competion	 for	 attracting	 investments	 and	 improving	 their	 position	 within	
international	 urban	 networks,	 have	 posed	 significant	 challenges	 for	 the	
transforming	 capital	 cities	 of	 CEE	 countries.	 The	 capital	 cities	 of	 the	 most	
dynamically	reforming	states	of	Poland,	Hungary,	and	the	Czech	Republic	were	
the	most	 exposed	 to	 globalization	 and	EU	 integration,	 and	 have	 been	 playing	
a	leading	role	in	their	transforming	economies.	
The	 transformation	 and	 modernization	 of	 capital	 cities	 were	 characterised	
by	 two	 simultanous	 processes.	 First, metropolitan transformation	 has	 led	 to	
important	 structural	 changes	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 characterised	 by	
economic	 restructuring,	 and	 by	 the	 shift	 from	 industrial	 to	 service	 economy.	
Second, the international integration	of	the	capitals	of	the	Visegrád	Group2	into	
the	global	world-city	networks	has	played	a	key	role	in	the	formation	of	IFCs.	
These	 cities	 started	 to	 internationalise	 their	 financial	 and	 business	 functions	
beginning	in	the	early	1990s,	while	simultaneously	searching	for	investors	and	
a	particular	‘niche’	in	which	to	specialise	in	trans-national	(European)	and	cross-
border	(regional)	urban	networks.	Simultaneously,	capital	cities	became	gateway	
cities	by	attracting	a	significant	number	of	western	corporations,	who	placed	their	
regional	headquarters	responsible	for	business	operations	in	the	entire	CEE	region	
there.	The	position	of	Budapest,	Prague,	and	Warsaw	was	enhanced	from	the	rank	
of	cities	of	national	significance	to	cities	of	European	importance	(Enyedi,	1998;	
Csomós,	2011).	
Economic	transition	has	been	most	beneficial	for	capital	cities.	It	means	that	
the	overwhelming	part	of	GDP	is	produced	in	the	capital	city-regions	(in	Hungary	
–	48%,	in	Slovakia	–	60%).	In	the	period	1995–2009,	capital	city-regions	in	CEE	
countries	grew	more	rapidly	than	other	regions	and	cities	of	the	European	Union	
(Gál	and	Lux,	2014).	In	fact,	after	two	decades	of	city	transformations,	there	is	
considerable	rivalry	and	competition	among	CEE	cities	for	access	to	resources,	
investments,	and	networks,	which	could	diminish	the	overall	competitive	strength	
and	cohesiveness	of	an	enlarged	European	Union.	If	we	take	a	closer	look	at	the	
financial	functions	of	competing	capital	cities	and	examine	them	in	the	context	
of	financial	market	transitions,	we	can	clearly	see	the	emergence	of	winners	and	
loosers.	
2	 Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Poland,	Slovakia.
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Development of functions of national and international financial centres in 
Central and Eastern Europe – the rise and fall of Budapest 
Revival	of	financial	centre	functions	during	the	transition	period
Transitions	of	the	financial	markets	and	changes	in	the	urban	fabric	of	national	
financial	centres	in	CEE	are	seen	as	both	path-dependent	and	path-shaping	process,	
where	history	and	the	legacies	of	earlier	modernization	processes	(catching-ups)	
in	the	region	matter,	but	new	trajectories	are	also	possible	(Sokol,	2001).	
In	the	early	1990s,	after	40	years	of	discontinuity	during	the	communist	period,	
Hungary’s	financial	 sector	 reintegrated	 into	a	global	financial	 system	 that	was	
shaped	by	powerful	processes	of	globalization.	A	common	characteristic	of	the	
spatial	organization	of	the	Hungarian	banking	system	before	and	after	the	political	
transitions	 in	 the	 1990s	was	 an	 extremely	 high	 concentration	 of	 headquarters	
function	in	the	capital	city.	This	peculiarity	could	be	explained	by	the	mode	of	
revival	of	the	modern	Hungarian	banking	system.	A	specificity	of	banking	systems	
in	transition	economies	is	that	financial	markets	did	not	emerge	organically.	With	
the	 separation	 of	 central	 banking	 and	 commercial	 banking	 functions	 in	 1987,	
a	two-tier	system	was	established	from	above	and	was	supervised	by	a	central	
authority.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 financial	 resources	 were	 mainly	 concentrated	 in	
the	capital	cities	as	a	 legacy	of	 the	centrally	managed	state	economy.	Its	main	
command	and	control	functions	were	already	strongly	centralised	in	capital	cities,	
like	Budapest.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	new	system	practically	 reproduced	 the	earlier	
Budapest-centred,	 over-centralised	 state-socialist	 mono-bank	 structure,	 even	
if	 more	 financial	 institutions	 were	 founded.	 Early	 privatisation	 dominated	 by	
foreign	banks	and	EU	regulations	further	reinforced	these	functions	of	financial	
centre. 
As	the	centre	of	the	national	economy,	Budapest	is	also	the	country’s	financial	
centre.	 International	 relations	 in	 the	 financial	 sector	 are	 administered	 via	 the	
capital	city.	All	institutions	and	functions	associated	with	these	roles	are	located	
there.	 Budapest	 has	 the	 only	 stock	 exchange	 in	 the	 country.	 It	 concentrates	
the	head	offices	of	banks,	 insurance	companies,	 specialised	credit	 institutions,	
building	societies,	mortgage	banks,	and	lease	companies.	The	significance	of	the	
capital’s	special	strategic	geographical	location	in	the	national	financial	system	
also	 derives	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 important,	 so-called	 ‘critical	 information’	 (i.e.	
making	bank	strategies,	central	data	provision,	access	to	the	giro-system)	flows	
exclusively	via	 the	centre.	Institutions	for	maintaining	contact	with	other	IFCs	
are	also	to	be	found	there.	The	number	of	financial	sector	employees	in	Budapest	
is	equal	 to	40	 thousand,	which	 is	56%	of	 the	 total	country’s	workforce	 in	 this	
sector	(2013).
Financial	centres	located	at	the	top	of	the	urban	hierarchy	concentrate	the	greatest	
amounts	of	capital.	This	results	in	significant	regional	disparities	(Porteous,	1995;	
Leyshon,	Thrift,	1997).	In	the	case	of	Hungary,	this	means	that	94%	of	banking	
capital	stock	is	concentrated	in	Budapest.	Since	banks	available	for	privatisation	
were	exclusively	located	in	Budapest,	as	were	greenfield	banking	investments,	
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in	effect	100%	of	foreign	capital	invested	in	the	sector	was	concentrated	in	the	
city.	The	common	feature	of	CEE	transition	economies	is	the	scarcity	of	locally	
founded	banks.
Role	of	the	foreign	capital	in	the	formation	of	financial	centres	and	asymmetric	
power	relations	
Dependent	 market	 economies3	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 are	 heavy	
importers	 of	 capital,	 therefore	 the	 ratio	 of	 inward	 and	 outward	 FDI	 stock	 is	
much	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 EU-15,	 due	 to	 the	 low	 level	 of	 capital	 exports	 from	
these	 countries	 (Nölke	 and	Vliegenthart,	 2009).	 Foreign	 financial	 inflows	 and	
especially	 FDI	 have	 resulted	 in	 dramatic	 changes	 of	 ownership	 structures.	 In	
1994,	in	the	wake	of	the	early	transition	crises,	an	overwhelming	majority	of	the	
banks	in	post-communist	countries	were	still	state-owned.	There	was	a	double	
shift	of	ownership	from	the	public	to	private	sector	and	at	the	same	time	from	
domestic	 to	 foreign	 owners	 through	 privatisation.	 In	 contrast,	 in	 2007	 private	
foreign	 ownership	 already	 accounted	 for	 about	 80%	 of	 banks’	 assets	 in	 the	
CEE	region.4	Hungarian	financial	markets,	similarly	to	other	CEE	counterparts,	
remained	 rather	 bank-cented,	 and	 security	markets	played	only	 a	 limited	 role.	
The	only	exeption	in	the	region	is	 the	revival	of	 the	Warsaw	securities	market	
since	the	mid-2000s	(Mykhnenko,	2007;	Wójcik,	2007).
At	the	beginning	of	the	1990s,	the	Hungarian	banking	system	–	similarly	to	its	
Eastern	and	Central	European	counterparts	–	faced	the	problem	of	reintegration	
into	international	markets,	while	also	witnessing	the	swift	spread	of	foreign	capital,	
which	was	to	play	a	leading	role	in	accelerating	modernisation	and	privatisation.	
Unlike	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 where	 voucher-based	 mass	 privatization	 was	
followed	by	a	relatively	belated	recapitalization	and	foreignization	of	the	banking	
sector,	or	in	Poland,	where	not	only	a	belated	banking	reform	but	also	a	gradual	
and	 well-regulated	 privatization	 made	 much	 more	 room	 for	 the	 state	 and	
privately	owned	domestic	banks,	the	rapid	‘de-nationalisation’	and	foreignization	
of	the	Hungarian	banking	system	was	unique	in	the	region	in	the	begining	of	the	
transition	period.5	 It	 created	a	peculiar	ownership	 structure,	differing	 from	 the	
majority	 of	 developed	 countries	 as	well,	 in	which	 the share of foreign-owned 
banks reached	around	75%	by	2000	(Gál,	2005).	Foreign	financial	inflows	have	
resulted	 in	 dramatic	 changes	 of	 ownership	 structures	 throughout	 the	 region.	
In	 1994,	 in	 the	wake	 of	 the	 early	 transition	 crises,	 an	 overwhelming	majority	
of	financial	 intermediaries	 in	 the	 post-communist	 countries	were	 still	 publicly	
3	 See: Nölke	and	Vliegenthart,	2009;	Raviv,	2008.
4	 These	figures	are	especially	striking	when	we	compare	them	with	the	average	level	for	the	
EU-25,	where	the	share	of	foreign-owned	banking	assets	in	total	is	less	than	one	quarter.	In	the	
Euro	area	this	figure	is	equal	to	15.5%.	Even	the	average	for	non-OECD	countries	is	50%	(Gál,	
2014).
5	 This	 rapid	 privatization	 of	 the	 banking	 sector	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 bankruptcies	 and	 the	
regulation	of	the	supervision	of	the	banking	sector	as	well	as	bank and credit consolidation	with	
significant	state	participation	(its	cost	was	equal	14%	of	the	GDP	by	1999).
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owned.	By	contrast,	in	2007,	more	than	a	decade	later,	private	foreign	ownership	
already	accounted	for	about	80%	of	financial	intermediaries’	assets	in	the	CEE	
region.
Traditional	 ‘modernization	 theory’	 highlights	 the	 key	 role	 of	 foreign	 banks	
in	institutional	development,	stability,	and	the	increase	of	financial	depth	of	the	
banking	sectors,	and	emphasizes	that	FDI	increased	the	host	country’s	integration	
into	the	global	economy	(Wachtel,	1997;	Várhegyi,	2002;	Csaba,	2011).	If	we	try	
to	place	the	CEE	region	in	the	comparative	typologies	of	capitalism	following	
Nölke	and	Vliegenthart’s	(2009) argument,	the	primary	source	of	investment	in	
the	CEE	is	foreign	direct	investment,	not	the	stock	market	as	in	Liberal	Market	
Economies	 (LME),	 or	 domestic	 credit	 as	 in	 Coordinated	 Market	 Economies	
(CME).	Although	FDI	does	play	a	role	in	the	other	capitalist	models,	the	degree	
of	external	dependency	is	much	more	extreme	in	the	CEE	(Raviv,	2008).	Foreign	
banks	 (understandably)	 followed	 commercial	 market-seeking	 principles,	 and	
even	the	governments	of	host	countries	were	not	active	in	gearing	or	‘diverting’	
them	through	various	regulations	towards	addressing	the	development	needs	of	
their	 economies.	 ‘Rather,	 they	were	 always	 aimed	 at	 redressing	 the	 declining	
profitability	 of	 financial	 institutions	 operating	 in	 the	 already	 financialised	
economies	 of	 Western	 Europe.	 As	 a	 result,	 foreign	 financiers	 emerged	 as	
a	 powerful	 rentier	 class	 in	Central	 Europe	 able	 to	 extract	 rent	 incomes	 far	 in	
excess	of	their	profits	in	the	west’	(Raviv,	2008,	p.	311).	
DMEs	are	 is	characterised	by	an	unequal	power	 relation	between	 the	home	
countries	 and	 the	CEECs	 through	 parent-subsidiary	 networks	 of	TNCs.	 ‘Dual	
banking	 system’	 model,	 characterized	 by	 the	 dominance	 of	 foreign-owned	
commercial	 banks,	 became	 common	 in	 these	 economies	 (Alessandrini	 and	
Zazzaro,	1999;	Gál,	2005).	Dual–economies	literature	argues	that	FDI	generates	
typical	 core-periphery	 disparities	 between	 old	 and	 new	Member	 States.	 That	
model,	 consisting	 of	 large	 foreign	 banks	 and	 small	 local/indigenous	 banks,	
displays	 strong	 dependence	 on	 foreign	 banks	 and	 their	 resources	 (external	
liabilities	vs.	local	savings).	Financial	TNCs	in	the	primary	international	financial	
centres	have	a	massive	concentration	of	resources	that	allow	them	to	maximise	the	
benefits	of	information	and	connectivity	with	other	centres.	Inter-linkages	that	are	
established	between	their	subsidiaries	and	their	parent	bank	generate	asymmetric	
power	 relations	 executed	 through	 their	 affiliates	 (Karreman,	 2009;	 Wójcik,	
2007;	Gál,	2010a).	These	power	relations	mediate	strong	command	andcontrol	
functions	over	CEE	countries	within	 the	 international	financial	centre	network	
from	which	these	investments	are	controlled.	Asymmetric	power	relations	also	
play	a	significant	role	in	the	international	financial	centre	function	of	Budapest,	
Warsaw,	and	Prague,	and	provide	certain	unfavourable	preconditions.
As	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	are	largely	dependent	on	foreign	
investors	 in	 finance,	 explicit	 attention	 is	 directed	 at	 determining	 which	 CEE	
financial	 centres	 attract	 multinational	 financial	 firms,	 and	 Karreman	 (2009)	
examined	 from	 which	 international	 financial	 centres	 these	 investments	 are	
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controlled.	The	banking	sector	in	the	CEE	region	is	predominantly	commanded	
from	the	financial	hubs	of	the	neighbouring	‘old’	EU	Member	States.6 
Factors	of	the	formation	of	Budapest’s	IFC	in	comparison	with	its	CEE	conterparts
This	section	quantitatively	examines	the	development	of	international	financial	
centre	function	of	Budapest,	as	compared	to	Warsaw	and	Prague,	assessing	the	
preconditions	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 IFC.	 It	 also	 tries	 to	find	market	 evidence	
showing	 some	 signs	 of	 IFC	 formation,	with	 a	 particular	 regional	 focus	 in	 the	
three	cities.	
As	we	noted	before,	the	capital	cities	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	became	
major	 gateways	 for	 FDI	 investments,	 and	 headquarters	 of	TNCs’	 subsidiaries	
expansion	towards	new	markets.	Early	GaWC7	research	(Beaverstock	et	al.,	1999)	
reflects	the	increasing	economic	significance	of	these	capital	cities	in	CEE,	and	as	
a	consequence	they	became	an	agglomeration	of	advance	business	services.	On	
the	basis	of	 the	agglomeration	of	banking,	accountancy,	 legal,	and	advertizing	
services	firms,	capital	cities	of	CEE	have	shown	their	visibility	in	the	third	level	
group	 of	 gamma	world-cities,	 in	 line	with	 other	 secondary	European	 services	
centres	(Hamburg,	Munich,	Berlin,	Cologne)	(Csomós,	2011).	Prague,	Warsaw,	
and	Budapest	were	major	centres	in	at	least	one	category	of	high-order	services.	
According	to	Taylor	(2004),	who	examined	the	global	network	connectivity	of	
banking	 firms,	Warsaw	 ranked	 9th	 in	 Europe,	 followed	 by	 Prague	 (17th)	 and	
Budapest	(19th).8 
Csomós	(2011)	compared	these	capital	cities	on	the	basis	of	 their	economic	
strength	measured	 by	GDP	 (PPS).	 In	 2008,	Warsaw,	with	 68Bn	USD,	 ranked	
85th	(followed	by	Hamburg),	Budapest	with	53	Bn	USD	was	100th	and	Prague	
was	 the	106th.	Functions	of	 coordination	and	control	 can	be	measured	by	 the	
number	 of	 corporate	 headquarters	 of	 domestic	 companies	 located	 in	 these	
capitals.9	 Multinational	 companies	 and	 banks	 prefer	 to	 hierarchically	 control	
local	 subsidiaries	 from	 the	 headquarters	 of	 their	 parent	 banks	 located	 in	 the	
IFCs	outside	 the	CEE	region	(Myant,	Drahokoupil,	2010). From	the	emerging	
international	 financial	 centre	 funtions	 point	 of	 view,	 headquarters	 of	 locally	
6	 Vienna,	Stockholm,	 and	Athens,	 among	others,	 became	gateways	 to	 the	East	 and	hosted	
the	headquarters	of	large	investors	in	the	CEE,	Baltics,	and	Southeastern	Europe,	respectively.	
The	largest	concentration	of	parent-subsidiary	connections	forms	bridgehead	centres	(Moscow,	
Warsaw,	Budapest)	in	the	CEE.
7	 Globalization	and	World	City	Network
8	 Warsaw	was	 the	25th	most	 connetcted	 IFC	worldwide	according	 to	 the	banking	network	
connectivity	in	2003.	
9	 According	to	the	Forbes	Global	2000	database,	in	2010	the	world’s	135th	largest	HQ	city	in	
CEE	is	Budapest,	with	26	Bn	USD	aggregate	turnover	of	the	companies	located	there.	Budapest	
is	followed	by	Warsaw,	which	is	only	ranked	227th,	and	Prague	with	238th	place	(with	11	and	
10Bn	USD	 turnover	 respectively).	 It	 has	 to	 be	 noted	 that	while	 both	Hungary	 and	 the	Czech	
Republic	are	represented	by	single	capital	cities	with	a	very	high	geographical	concentration	of	
HQ	function,	Poland	is	represented	by	three	additional	cities	(Plock,	Gdansk,	and	Lublin).
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based	multinational	companies	matter	more	as	they	concentrate	their	own	control	
functions	in	Central	and	Eastern	European	IFCs	(Gál,	2014).10 
The	 next	 section	 summarises	 the	 factors	 of	 IFC	 functions	 through	 analysis	
of	the	selected	indicators	in	the	three	capital	cities	(Budapest,	Prague,	Warsaw).	
Various	data,	such	as	employment	figures,	presence	of	foreign	banks,	depth	of	
financial	sector,	and	the	size	of	stock	markets,	illustrate	the	main	factors	of	the	
development	of	international	financial	centre	functions.	
Employment	in	financial	services
Employment	in	the	financial	sector	has	the	highest	share	(10.6%)	in	Warsaw,	
demonstrating	 the	growing	 importance	of	financial	 centre	 functions	 (Table	 1).	
The	relative	weight	of	its	finacial	sector	corresponds	with	the	share	of	the	leading	
global	 IFCs.	 Contrary	 to	Warsaw,	 Budapest	 shows	 the	 lowest	 relative	weight	
of	 this	sector,	which	also	demonstrates	higher	volatility	and	very	slow	growth	
during	the	entire	transition	period.	
Table 1. Share of Financial sector in total employment of the capital cities (%)
% of total 
employment
Budapest Warsaw Prague
1995 2002 2013 1995 2001 2013 1995 2001 2013
Financial 
Intermediation (K)
3.5 3.8 4.3 6.0 7.8 10.6 3.2 4.9 6.3
The	relative	importance	of	the	financial	sector	in	the	three	cities	is	evaluated	by	
calculating	location	quotients	(LQ).11	According	to	the	domestic	LQ,	Warsaw’s	
financial	 sector	 dominance	 within	 the	 Polish	 economy	 is	 clearly	 marked	 by	
its	 almost	 five-folds	 (4.4)	 share	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 share	 of	 that	 sector	 in	
nationwide	employment	(Table	2).	In	the	case	of	Budapest	the	same	ratio	(2.0)	
rather	indicates	a	stagnation,	while	Prague	managed	to	increase	the	importance	of	
its	financial	sector	within	the	domestic	economy.	The	intercity	LQ	compares	the	
weight	of	finance	of	each	city	with	the	average	structure	of	all	three	capital	cities.	
While	Budapest’s	position	negatively	deviates	from	the	average,	Warsaw’s	share	
significantly	 exceeds	 it,	 demonstrating	 the	 successful	 adaptation	 of	 the	 Polish	
capital	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 global	 economy,	 and	 the	 common	 tendency	
towards	metropolization marked	by	the	increasing	weight	of	its	financial	sector.
10 Budapest	is	a	peculiar	IFC	in	this	sense,	as	it	is	the	only	centre	that	developed	its	
own	control	functions	due	to	the	fact	that	the	only	Eastern	European	regionally	based	
multinational	bank	(outside	Russia	and	to	some	extent	Slovenia),	the	OTP	Bank,	has	its	
headquarters	in	Budapest.
11 For	the	financial	sector,	the	domestic	LQ	is	the	ratio	of	the	share	of	that	sector	in	
the	city	employment	to	the	share	of	that	sector	in	the	nationwide	employment.	It	relates	
the	city	structure	to	the	country	structure,	so	identical	city	structures	generate	different	
domestic	LQ	values	depending	on	the	country	structures.	The	intercity	LQ	is	the	ratio	
of	the	share	of	that	sector	in	the	city	employment	to	the	average	share	of	that	sector	in	
the	five	capital	cities.	This	LQ	is	independent	of	the	country	structures.	It	permits	direct	
comparisons	between	the	employment	structures	of	the	three	cities.
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Table 2. Domestic (Dom LQ) and Inter-city (IC LQ) Location quotients of capital cities on 
the basis of employment in the financial intermediation sector (2001)
NACE
1 rev. 1
Average 
employmen 
in 3 cities
%
Budapest Prague Warszawa
IC LQ Dom LQ IC LQ
Dom 
LQ IC LQ
Dom 
LQ
K (2001) 5.5 0.8 1.9 1.0 2.4 1.2 2.6
K (2013) 7.0 0,6 2.0 0.9 3.3 1.5 4.4
1 Intercity LQ (IC LQ)
2 Domestic LQ (Dom LQ)
Source: Bourdeau-Lepage, 2003, author’s calulation based on data of Central statistical offices. 
Size	of	banking	sector	within	the	economy
Banking	 assets	 of	 eight	 new	Central	 and	Eastern	European	Member	 States	
(who	joined	in	2004)	was	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	EU	as	a	whole,	1.2%	of	the	
total	EU-25	assets	in	2005,	and	so	only	a	small	segment	of	the	European	banking	
market.12	The	Hungarian	banking	system	was	the	smallest	of	the	three	countries,	
only	slightly	more	than	one-third	of	the	Polish	banking	system	(50	billion	Euros).
Table 3. Overview of banking sector developments, 2005–2013
%
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
2005 2013 2005 2013 2005 2013
Bank assets (Bn EUR) 100 (159)* 
190
78 (124)* 
105
164 (274)* 
339
Bank assets/financial assets, % 81.1 68.8 86.2 76.6 84.8 70.0
Share of foreign banks  
(% of total asstes)
94.5 83 84.5 67* 69.9 62
Banking assets/GDP 101.0 135 90.1 108.0 62.4 86.2
Loans to private sector/GDP 17.6 22.5 26.0 23.2 16.5 17.0
Loans to househods/GDP 12.7 28.4 17.2 23.7 31.0 37.0
Total deposit/GDP 62.7 86.7 39.3 43.1 32.9 47.5
Loans in foreign currency  
(% of total loans)
13 18 38.6 51 26.2 30.0
Loan-to-deposit, % 63.7 75.0 113 110 78.8 108.0
ROA (return on asstes) 1.4 1.4 2.2 0.5 1.6 1.1
* Data for 2009.
Source: central banks, CEE banking reports, Raiffessen Bank.
12	 This	was	equal	to	the	size	of	the	Portuguese	banking	system	or	the	assets	of	the	Royal	Bank	
of	Scotland	(in	2003),	and	almost	three	times	smaller	than	the	size	of	Deutsche	Bank.	The	average	
bank	size	in	this	market	was	about	1.3	billion	Euros.
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Financial	markets	in	the	region	remained	rather	bank-centred	as	a	consequence	
of	slowly	developing	capital	markets	(Mykhnenko,	2007).	The	share	of	banks	in	
the	financial	sector	assets	is	still	around	70%.	The	depth	of	banking,	measured	
by	 assets	 per	 GDP,	 was	 the	 highest	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 (101	 and	 135%	
respectively)	and	the	lowest	in	Poland	(62.4	and	86%).	Hungary	with	its	figures	
ranked	 in	 the	middle	 (Table	3).	As	 for	 the	banking	 sector,	when	measured	by	
operational	efficiency	and	profit	indicators	the	Hungarian	banking	system	proved	
to	be	the	most	at	the	beginning	and	the	least	efficient	at	the	end	of	our	research	
period.	
Operational	 efficiency	 of	 the	 banking	 sector	 has	 improved	 significantly	 in	
the	region	after	a	relatively	short	transition	crisis.	However,	prior	to	the	recent	
2008	crisis,	banking	sectors	in	CEE	had	become	a	major	target	of	credit-fuelled	
growth.	Foreign	banks	played	a	significant	role	in	the	transmission	of	contagion	
to	transition	economies.	
	Presence	of	foreign	banks
The	 spatial	 concentration	 of	 foreign	 banks	 is	 an	 important	 indicator	 of	 the	
global	integration	of	the	financial	center	of	the	region.	However,	the	clear	indicator	
of	a	thriving	international	financial	center	is	 the	increasing	presence	of	private	
investment	banks.	As	the	economies	recovered	from	the	transition	crisis	and	the	
Table 4. Offices of 15 largest private investment banks in three CEE capital cities, 2005
Warsaw Prague Budapest
J.P. Morgan X X –
Merill Lynch X – –
Morgan Stanley – – –
Goldman Sachs – – –
Deutsche Bank X X X
Citibank X X X
Bank of New York – – –
Barclays – – –
State Street – X –
UBS X X –
Nomura – – X
Credit Suisse FB X – –
Shroeders – – –
Lehman Brothers – – –
HSBC X X X
Brown Brothers Harriman – – –
Total 7 (2) 6 (1) 4 (1)
(1) Bank office is exclusively located in only one out of the three cities. 
Source: Gál, 2010a. 
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EU	expansion	was	completed,	foreign	investment	banks	such	as	Goldman	Sachs,	
J.	P.	Morgan	Chase,	and	Credit	Suisse	set	up	their	offices	in	each	of	three	analysed	
capitals.	The	presence	of	the	15	largest	investment	banks	was	examined	in	2005	
(Gál,	2010a).	Despite	 the	 relatively	 low	 level	of	overall	presence	at	 that	 time,	
Warsaw	proved	to	be	the	most	attractive	location,	where	seven	investment	banks	
had	their	representation,	while	only	four	such	offices	were	opened	in	Budapest	
(Table	4).	A	relatively	 large	and	crisis-resilient	Polish	economy	attracted	more	
investment	 banks	 than	 all	 their	 counterparts	 put	 together.	 In	 2011	 Goldman	
Sachs	opened	its	Warsaw	investment	banking	office,	considering	Warsaw	as	an	
important	financial	hub	with	huge	development	potential	 for	 the	whole	 region	
(Hashimoto,	2015).
Cross-border	flows	in	the	financial	sector	
Cross	 border	 financial	 flows	 and	 their	 direction	 (inflows-outflows,	 capital	
import-export)	are	one	of	the	major	indicators	of	the	international	integration	of	
IFCs.13	During	the	first	phase	of	transition,	FDI	was	the	most	important	source	
of	 cross-border	 capital	 flows	 in	CEECs,	 although,	with	 varied	 timing,	mainly	
because	of	the	different	privatisation	timetables	in	different	countries	in	the	pre-
crisis	era	(Figure	1).	Data	shows	that	Hungary	lost	its	attractiveness	even	before	
the	financial	crisis.	In	terms	of	the	stock	of	FDI	in	the	sector,	Poland	stood	out	
in	2007,	with	more	than	20	billion	Euros	foreign	investment	demonstrating	its	
greater	 potential	 to	 attaract	 new	 strategic	 investments	 in	 the	 Polish	 financial	
sector.	Changes	 in	 FDI	flows	 during	 the	 crisis	 period	were	 substantial.	While	
there	was	a	smaller	fall	of	FDI	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	a	larger	one	in	Poland	
in	 2009,	 FDI	 stock	 in	 financial	 services	was	mainly	 characterised	 by	 growth,	
while	in	Hungary	this	indicator	slightly	decreased	during	the	crisis	(Gál	and	Sass,	
2013).	
There	are	significant	cross-border	transactions	channelled	through	the	networks	
of	 the	West	European	parent	banks	and	their	 local	subsidiaries.	About	50-70%	
of	corporate	 lending	and	60%	of	 interbank	lending	 in	2009	was	 the	subject	of	
cross-border	 transactions,	 which	 not	 only	 has	 an	 implication	 for	 increasing	
international	integrartion	of	CEE	financial	markets	by	strengthening	connectivity	
to	the	European	IFCs,	but	also,	these	links	generated	imbalances	in	the	banking	
system	 during	 the	 time	 of	 the	 crisis,	 as	 the	 CEE	 remained	 largely	 reliant	 on	
cross-border	 lending.	Hungary	experienced	higher	cross-border	 lending,	which	
is	 expected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 economic	 fundamentals,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 had	
developed	significant	vulnerabilities	in	the	pre-crisis	period.	This	resulted	in	the	
largest	drop	 in	cross-border	 lending	 (unlike	Poland,	which	almost	managed	 to	
maintain	 its	 international	position,	and	the	Czech	Republic,	where	demand	for	
cross-border	lending	remained	low).	Cross-border	bank	flows	demonstrate	that	
13	 Although	the	data	available	on	country	level,	due	to	the	dominant	role	of	financial	centres	
these	flows	are	conrolled	and	intermediated	by	financial	institutions/subsidiaries	located	in	the	
host	IFCs.	
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Poland	has	 leading	position	of	attracting	banking	flows,	while	Hungary	shows	
larger	fluctuation	in	this	sense	(Table	5).	
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Figure 1. FDI stock in financial services, 2006–2011 (million Euros)
Source: National banks.
Another	 parallel	 process,	 namely	 the	 rapid	 surge	 in	 outward	 foreign	 direct	
investment	 (OFDI)	 generated	 by	 the	 cross-border	 activities	 of	 locally-based	
multinational	 banks,	 made	 Hungarian	 companies	 prominent	 foreign	 investors	
in	 the	wider	Eastern	European	 region.	Financial	 capital	 export	 to	Eastern	 and	
Central	Europe	 is	dominated	by	bank	acquisitions	of	OTP,	 the	 largest	bank	of	
Hungary,	and	OTP	become	the	only	‘indigenous’	multinational	bank	in	the	region	
(by	2008,	40%	of	assets,	66%	of	branches,	and	the	38%	of	total	loans	of	OTP	
bank	were	generated	abroad)14	(Gál,	2014).	
Table 5. External positions (cross-border claims) of BIS15 reporting banks vis-a-vis CEE 
countries, 1996–2013
1996
Bn USD
2004
Bn USD
2008
Bn USD
2013
Bn USD
Hungary 1.4 39.8 95.0 43.2
Poland 7.2 40.9 138.0 120.6
Czech Republlic 7.2 17.3 54.0 51.2
Source: BIS Annual Reports.
14	 OTP	Group	currently	operates	 in	Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Romania,	Serbia,	Slovakia,	Ukraine	
(CJSC	OTP	Bank),	Russia,	and	Montenegro	via	its	subsidiaries.	Until	2004,	28%	of	Hungary’s	
FDI	export	was	generated	in	the	banking	sector.	
15	 Bank	of	International	Settlements	(BIS),	Basel
ZOLTÁN GÁL68
Size	of	the	capital	markets
Studies	focused	on	global	cities	draw	attention	to	the	fact	that	the	dominant	
feature	 of	 these	 leading	 cities	 is	 the	 considerable	 concentration	 of	 financial	
capital,	 not	 only	 in	 banking	 but	 also	 in	 stock	 markets.	 Data	 on	 total	 market	
capitalisation	and	the	number	of	companies	listed	on	stock	exchanges,	therefore,	
serves	 as	 an	 ideal	 index	 for	measuring	financial	 centre	development.	 It	 has	 to	
be	 noted	 that	 stock	 exchanges	 in	 the	CEE	 countries	 have	 taken	 a	 fairly	 short	
period	of	 time	to	reach	 their	 recent	potential.	There	are	no	 large	companies	 in	
the	 region	 with	 longer	 stock	 market	 experience	 and	 none	 of	 the	 institutional	
investors	has	 long	history	of	presence	 in	 the	region.	All	CEE	stock	exchanges	
were	 launched	as	 late	as	 the	early	1990s,	after	 the	change	of	 the	political	and	
economic	regime.	Budapest	Stock	Exchange	was	founded	in	1990.	As	the	fast	
economic	uplift	in	the	countries	of	the	Visegrad	Group	was	substantially	driven	by	
FDI,	the	contribution	of	domestic	companies	to	the	GDP	of	the	national	economy	
remained	rather	small.	As	it	is	primarily	domestic	companies	that	are	listed	at	the	
regional	stock	exchanges,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	value	for	domestic	market	
capitalization	 is	 low	 (Csomós,	 2011)	 (Table	 6).	 The	 market	 capitalization	 of	
the	new	EU	Member	States	accounted	for	only	2%	of	market	capitalization	of	
the	EU	in	2004.	The	aggregated	size	of	the	Warsaw	(WSE),	Prague	(PSE)	and	
Budapest	(BSE)	Stock	Exchanges	was	equal	to	only	13%	of	capitalization	of	the	
Deutsche	Börse	at	a	time.	Due	to	the	relatively	strong	banking	sector	and	the	non-
organic	development	of	capital	markets	in	the	region,	firms	were	allowed	to	seek	
affordable	bank	loans	rather	than	to	endeavour	to	attract	investments	through	less	
mature	stock	exchanges.	In	addition,	the	propensity	of	households	to	raise	funds	
in	the	capital	market	is	still	low.
Despite	 its	 slow	 start,	 the	 Warsaw	 stock	 exchange	 rapidly	 increased	 its	
capitalization	 from	 the	 early	 2000s	 and	 attracted	 more	 companies	 for	 listing	
than	did	neighbouring	stock	exchanges	(Budapest,	Prague,	Vienna).	The	effect	
of	financial	crisis	was	visible	in	both	2008	and	2011,	although	Warsaw	seemed	
to	recover	faster	than	the	other	financial	centres.	The	development	of	the	stock	
market	 in	 Budapest,	 once	 a	 forerunner	 in	 the	 region,	 has	 been	 rather	 weak,	
with	the	current	level	of	market	capitalisation	being	comparable	to	the	pre-EU	
accession	period	level,	despite	a	steady	increase	of	GDP	(Figure	2).	The	number	
of	companies	listed	in	Warsaw	in	2013	doubled	since	2009	and	reached	895,	out	
of	which	26	are	foreign.	This	level	is	significantly	higher	than	that	of	Vienna	–	102	
companies,	20	foreign;	Prague	(23	with	10	foreign)	in	Prague,	and	Budapest	(50,	
none	 foreign)	 (Federation	of	European	Securities	Exchanges,	2015)	 (Table	6).	
By	the	mid-2000s,	the	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange,	due	to	its	larger	capitalisation,	
posed	serious	competition	to	the	Budapest	Stock	Exchange.	The	Warsaw	Stock	
Exchange	became	the	leading	stock	exchange	of	the	region,	and	that	is	why	the	
Wiener	Börse	intends	to	compete	with	it	by	acquiring	control	over	the	smaller	
stock	exchanges	in	the	CEE	region.	The	rearrangement	of	the	ownership	structure	
of	these	stock	exchanges	suggests	that	Vienna	and	Warsaw	are	strengthening	their	
leadership	roles	in	the	CEE	region,	while	the	roles	of	Budapest	and	Prague	are	
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diminishing	(Csomós,	2011).	As	far	as	foreign	listing	is	concerned,	Budapest	no	
longer	seems	to	be	a	strong	international	capital	market	centre.16 
Assesment	of	the	function	of	Budapest	international	fi	nancial	centre	
The	 stake	 of	 the	 ongoing	 race	 among	metropolises	 in	 Eastern	 and	 Central	
Europe	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	2000s	was	 in	part	whether	Budapest,	with	 the	
relatively	most	developed	fi	nancial	markets	at	that	time,	could	become	a	regional	
business	 and	 fi	nancial	 centre	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 (Enyedi,	 1992).	
Nevertheless,	contradicting	former	optimistic	expectations,	Budapest	has	not	yet	
become	such	a	regional	fi	nancial	and	business	(gateway)	centre,	 the	envisaged	
‘Singapore	of	Central	Europe.’17	Rather,	as	a	result	of	the	crisis	and	the	recent	
unorthodox	economic	policy,	Budapest	seems	to	have	exited	from	the	regional	
competition	of	international	fi	nancial	centres	located	in	the	region	(Szabadföldi,	
2001;	Gál,	2010a).	At	the	same	time,	the	Hungarian	capital	did	have	the	potential	
to	acquire	competitive	advantages	in	certain	areas	of	the	fi	nancial	sector	in	the	
early	2000s.	Such	advantages	could	stem	from	its	central	location,	early	economic	
reforms	and	its	bridging	role	within	the	region.	Budapest’s	only	peculiar	role	as	
an	international	fi	nancial	centre	is	strengthened	by	the	fact	that	due	to	its	housing	
the	OTP	Bank’s	headquarters,	it	is	the	only	fi	nancial	centre	in	the	region	which	
16	 In	2011,	Poland’s	stock	market	ranked	fourth	in	the	amount	of	capital	raised.	At	the	WSE,	38	
new	companies	were	listed	in	2011,	and	25	of	these	were	foreign	ones. 
17	 In	the	period	of	dynamic	growth	in	Hungary	the	fi	rst	Orban	government	had	made	attempts	
to	develop	Budapest	as	CEE	regional	business	and	fi	nancial	centre.	See:	http://www.bibca.net/
en/home.
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Figure 2. Total market capitalisation in Million USD
Source: Edited by the author, World Federation of Exchanges, Annual Reports and Statistics.
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developed	 its	 own	 command	 and	 control	 functions	 over	 subsidiaries	 located	
abroad	(Gál,	2010b).	OTP’s	expansion	abroad	since	the	beginning	of	the	2000s	
increased	 the	connectivity	of	Budapest	 as	 a	 regional	finacial	 centre.	However,	
the	regional	banking	networks	alone	do	not	make	a	city	an	international	financial	
centre	–	especially	when	capital	markets	are	concerned.	
In	 other	 respects,	 however,	 Budapest	 is	 not	 unique	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	
regional	capitals	(Parague,	Warsaw),	which	are	rapidly	catching	up	–	they	had	
compatible,	 and	 even	 larger	 domestic	markets.	Another	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	
overlapping	foreign	ownership.	Foreign	banks	established	subsidiary	banks	with	
paralell	networks	controlled	by	managements	of	foreign	parents	rather	than	by	
selecting	a	single	regional	financial	centre.	Therefore	there	is	little	evidence	of	
regionalisation	in	the	banking	markets	of	Central	Europe.
However,	 already	 during	 the	 2000s	 there	 were	 serious	 impediments	 to	
Budapest’s	becoming	an	international	financial	centre.	Its	previous	competitive	
advantage	 in	 the	 financial	 sector	 and	 capital-attracting	 potential	 gradually	
decreased	due	to	the	deteriorating	macro-economic	position	of	the	contry	prior	
to	the	crisis.	The	competitive	advantage	of	Budapest	was	also	weakened	by	the	
organizational	 transformations	 of	 the	 BSE	 in	 2004.	 This	 allowed	 the	Wiener	
Börse,	following	a	policy	of	expansion	in	the	framework	of	takeovers,	to	acquire	
majority	shares	in	the	Hungarian	and	Czech	stock	exchanges.	Budapest’s	position	
concerning	its	independent	decision-making	functions	was	adversely	affected	by	
the	acquisition	of	the	Vienna	Stock	Exchange.18
In	 Budapest,	 despite	 a	 suitable	 supply	 of	 highly	 qualified	 professionals,	
qualifications	of	 the	available	workforce	still	 fall	 short	of	 international	quality	
standards.	 In	 an	 interview,	 the	CEO	 of	 a	US-owned	 bank	 emphasised	 that	 in	
certain	 areas	 of	 finance	 (accounting,	 cost-management,	 marketing	 and	 sales),	
there	 are	 especially	 serious	 shortcomings	 in	 labour	 supply.	 Consequently,	
financial	services	providers	tend	to	employ	foreign	managers.	
In	a	2007	interview	with	a	banking	analyst,	the	issue	of	functions	of	regional	IFC	
was	discussed.	The	inteviewee	argued	that	there	was	a	genuine	niche	for	creating	
a	regional	sub-centre	in	Budapest	and	for	providing	certain	special	back	office	
services	 for	 the	global	financial	firms.	Although	 the	capital	city	would	 remain	
primarily	a	national	financial	centre	while	extending	its	lower	level	international	
embededness	in	shared	services	and	business	process	outsourcing.	The	question	
is	whether	these	shared	services	locations	attracting	new	types	of	FDI	might	help	
in	repositioning	weakening	business	and	financial	centre	funcions.19 
18	 Since	the	Wiener	Börse	has	acquired	control	over	the	Budapest	stock	exchange,	a	series	of	
debates	arose	between	the	Austrian	management	and	the	handful	of	domestic	blue	chip	companies	
(OTP,	MOL,	Richter)	in	strategical	issues,	which	hinders	the	development	of	a	long-term	strategic	
vision	for	the	BSE.
19	 EU	accession,	competitive	infrastructure,	low	wages,	and	a	strong	education	system	were	
favourable	 preconditions	 that	 supported	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 first	 group	 of	 capital	 cities,	 such	
as	Prague,	Budapest,	 and	Warsaw,	 in	 the	first	wave	 of	 the	 offshoring	 boom	of	 the	 late	 1990s	
(however,	it	is	notable	that	advantages	in	rival	capitals	are	similar	and	mostly	based	on	low	wage	
cost)	(Gál	and	Sass,	2009;	Gál,	2014).	
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Contrary	to	IFC	locations,	shared	servies	centres	(SSC)	are	less	embedded	in	
their	national	and	regional	hinterlands,	and	these	supply	and	efficiency-driven20 
vertical	 investments	 across	 national	 boundaries	 are	 seeking	 low-cost	 global	
locations	 within	 transnational production systems.	 The	 demand-led	 market	
seeking	investments	(such	as	financial	FDI)	were	the	most	common	throughout	
the	begining	of	 the	 transition	period	 in	CEE	(Hardy	et	al.,	2011).	Due	 to	 their	
low	level	of	terriorial	embeddeness,	SSCs’	impact	on	their	host	location	is	rather	
limited.	Consequently,	SSC	locations	can	not	result	in	a	natural	evolution	to	an	
IFC,	as	 it	 lacks	the	geographical	concentration	of	 indigenous	and	international	
financial	 firms	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 command	 and	 control	 functions	 from	 their	
headquarters	(Bellon,	1998;	Pelly,	2001).
Although	 earlier	 consultancy	 reports	 revealed	 strong	 international	 business	
presence	(regional	headquarters,	advanced	service	providers,	IT,	accounting	and	
HR)	to	be	a	necessary	factor	for	developing	international	business	and	financial	
centre	functions	in	Budapest,	surveys	also	demonstrated	the	lack	of	leadership	both	
within	Budapest	as	well	as	in	the	CEE	region	(Szabadföldi,	2002;	Gál,	2010a). 
The	plan	to	compete	against	Warsaw	and	Prague	as	the	regional	business	centre	
was	introduced	in	2001.	This	plan	seemed	to	have	correctly	identified	Budapest’s	
comparative	advantages	vis-a-vis	‘western’	cities	(e.g.	Vienna),	but	it	was	short	
on	explaining	the	vision	for	distinctive	features	of	Budapest	vis-a-vis	Prague	and	
Warsaw	as	financial	centres.	Nevertheless,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	rise	and	fall	
of	Budapest	as	a	prominent	regional	financial	centre	could	be	explained	to	a	large	
extent	by	the	actions	and	successes	achieved	by	other	financial	centres.
Impact of 2008 global economic crisis on CEE financial centres
The	transition	of	the	financial	sector	in	the	CEE	region	has	received	considerable	
attention	during	the	transition	from	both	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	perspective	
(Bonin	et	al.,	1998;	Wachtel,	1997;	Claessens	et	al.,	2001;	Gál,	2004;	Várhegyi,	
2002;	Banai	et	al.,	2010;	Csaba,	2011),	but	much	less	attention	has	been	devoted	
to	the	post-transition	period	and	the	impact	of	the	crisis,	which	has	become	the	
most	serious	challenge	of	transition	models,	and	has	indirectly	affected	the	IFC	
conditions	of	the	capital	cities.	
Concerning	 the	 transmission	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 CEE,	 there	 are	 two	 distinct	
approaches	 in	 the	 transition	 literature.	According	 to	 Myant	 and	 Drahokoupil	
(2012),	the	financial	crisis	was	an	external	shock	to	the	CEE	region	and	affected	
countries	 in	 different	ways,	where	 finacial	 inflows	 and	 export	 flows	were	 the	
transmission	 channels	 of	 the	 contagion.	 The	 other	 arguments	 emphasize	 that	
the	crisis	cannot	simply	be	understood	as	an	internal	adjustment	to	an	external	
shock	 (Bohle,	 2011);	 rather,	 the	 global	 financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 exposed	
the	weaknesses	 of	 the	 post-socialist	 neo-liberal	 economic	 development	model	
20	 The	demand-led	horizontal	 investments	are	located	in	the	capital	city,	where	there	is	 the	
highest	demand	for	their	services.	For	supply	and	efficiency	driven	vertical	investments,	the	main	
attracting	factor	in	capital	cities	is	the	large	supply	of	suitable	and	relatively	cheap	skilled	workers	
(Hardy	et	al.,	2011).
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in	 CEE	 (EBRD	 Transition	 Report,	 2009).	 Smith	 and	 Swain	 (2010)	 focus	 on	
the	 dependent	 models	 and	 uneven	 forms	 of	 transition	 to	 capitalism	 and	 the	
internationalizatiotion	of	the	financial	sector	in	CEE.	They	argue	that	this	model	
of	transition	has	contributed	to	systemic	vulnerabilities	excerbated	by	the	crisis	
in	the	CEE	region.	
In	a	few	CEE	countries,	catching	up	in	the	first	half	of	the	2000s	was	generally	
accompanied	by	macroeconomic	stability	(Czech	Republic,	Slovakia,	and	partially	
Poland),	but	certain	countries	(Hungary,	Estonia,	Latvia)	of	the	region	became	
increasingly	 vulnerable	 to	 external	 shocks	 due	 to	 unsustainable	 trajectories	 of	
credit-fuelled	 housing	 and	 consumption	 booms,	 high	 current-account	 deficits,	
and	quickly	rising	external	debt	(a	large	proportion	of	it	denominated	in	foreign	
currencies).	 Foreign	 currency	 indebtedness	 channelled	 through	 interlinkages	
occurring	between	West	European	parent	banks	and	their	local	subsidiaries	had	an	
implication	for	the	internal	and	external	imbalance	within	the	EU	banking	system	
(Gorzelak	and	Goh,	2010).	The	impact	of	the	crisis	has	been	highly	uneven	within	
the	European	Union	and	has	not	only	increased	the	gap	between	the	core	countries	
and	the	peripheries,	but	also	resulted	in	growing	diversity	within	CEE.21 Poland 
has	avoided	recession	by	not	having	expanded	huge	debt	and	by	benefiting	from	
its	large	internal	markets	(Smith	and	Swain,	2010).	The	excessive	burden	of	debt	
repayment	resulted	in	severe	decline	both	in	investments	and	consumption.	This	
was	the	case	in	some	of	the	countries	that	experienced	negative	or	zero	growth	in	
2008	and	2009	(Latvia,	Hungary,	Romania).	
In	Hungary,	foreign	currency	indebtedness	had	direct	spillover	effecs	on	the	
national	economy	since	2009,	when	local	debt	crisis	affected	all	indebted	sectors	
(Gál,	2014).	The	impact	of	the	financial	crisis	increased	Hungary’s	dependence	on	
external	financing	and	also	weakened	the	position	of	Budapest	as	an	international	
financial	centre.	In	Hungary	and	the	Baltic	states,	funding	availability	and	capital	
outflows	led	to	a	more	severe	decline	in	bank	lending	than	the	Eurozone	average	
(measured	by	 loans	 to	 the	nonfinancial	 corporate	 sector).22	The	 crisis	has	 also	
altered	the	future	growth	prospects	of	these	CEE	countries;	monetary	and	fiscal	
policies	are	on	a	tightening	course	for	several	years	and	there	is	little	room	for	
powerful	 countercyclical	 policy	 responses.	 External	 capital	 inflows	 suddenly	
and	 significantly	 stopped	 despite	 the	 relatively	 quick	 recovery	 in	 the	 region. 
For	example,	 in	Hungary,	despite	 its	 recovery,	 the	scale	of	 investment	and	 the	
financial	intermediation	sector	remained	much	below	its	pre-crisis	level.
The	 financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 has	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 international	
financial	centre	position	of	the	capital	cities	studied.	Various	data	on	banking	and	
capital	markets	(lending	activity,	market	capitalisation)	illustrates	the	fluctuation	
in	 the	 concentration	 of	 IFC	 functions.	After	 the	 ambitious	 start	 of	 Budapest	
thanks	to	the	seemingly	successful	gradual	transition	model,	it	is	now	losing	the	
21	 Hungary’s	external	funding	exposure	was	the	highest	(while	the	Czech	Republic	had	the	
lowest),	reaching	one	third	of	total	liabilities	in	2009.
22	 The	 current	 FDI	 literature (Claessens	 and	 van	 Horen,	 2012)	 focusing	 on	 the	 impact	 of	
foreign	bank	presence	on	credit	creation	and	financial	 stability	during	 the	crisis	confronts	 the	
once-dominant	approach	of	‘supporting	effect’	of	foreign	banks (Haas	and	Lelyveld,	2009).
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race	with	other	CEE	capitals	to	become	the	international	financial	centre	in	the	
CEE	region.	
The	rapid	decline	of	Prague	as	a	financial	centre	in	the	late	1990s	and	Budapest	
in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2000s	 was	 accompanied	 by	 not	 only	 a	 less	 spectacular	
recovery,	but	also	by	the	rise	of	Warsaw,	especially	after	the	2008	financial	crisis.	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 recent	financial	 crisis	had	a	visible	effect	on	Warsaw	
in	2008	and	2011,	it	recovered	faster	than	other	financial	centres	in	the	region.	
In	this	regard	there	are	two	effects	in	play	–	the	country	effect	and	the	financial	
center	 effect.	Poland	was	not	only	able	 to	 avoid	 the	 recession,	but	well-timed	
regulations	managed	to	prevent	the	burst	of	the	housing	bubble.	Foreign	capital	
inflow	was	not	significantly	affected.	Warsaw	experienced	a	tremendous	scale	of	
public	and	private	 investments,	 and	 the	 large	domestic	market	generated	huge	
demand.	Poland	does	not	rely	heavily	on	export	(it	accounted	for	only	40%	of	
GDP,	half	of	the	percentage	of	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia).	The	EU	funds	
also	contributed	to	the	mitigation	of	the	effects	of	the	crisis	(Berend,	2013).	
Besides	 its	 crisis	 resilience,	 there	 are	 important	 factors	 that	 make	Warsaw 
suitable	for	the	functions	of	IFC	with	a	strong	regional	focus.	For	instance,	the	
high-standard	of	financial	regulations	in	the	Polish	financial	market	in	general,	
and	the	wise	and	active	strategy	that	made	the	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange	the	largest	
player	in	the	CEE	region.	This	strategy	is	acompanied	by	active	marketing,	and	
by	an	active	engagement	in	multilateral	trading	platform,	which	helped	link	the	
WSE	with	London	(Wójcik,	2007;	Hashimoto,	2015).	Warsaw	was	the	only	city	
of	the	three	that	managed	to	attract	many	foreign	investors	and	influencial	market	
players,	 even	during	 the	 time	of	 the	crisis.	With	 its	global	presence,	 the	WSE	
sucessfully	maintained	its	independence	from	Vienna,	unlike	its	larger	regional	
counterparts	(Budapest,	Prague).	
The	financial	 and	economic	crisis	have	had	a	moderate	 impact	on	Prague’s	
banking	 sector	 as	 the	 banking	 market	 was	 prudent,	 and	 the	 share	 of	 foreign	
currency	loans,	which	proved	to	be	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	subprime,	
was	insignificant.	The	Czech	Republic	experienced	‘reverse	flows’	because	of	the	
decrease	 in	cross-border	 lending	 in	spite	of	 its	strong	economic	fundamentals.	
However,	 the	 indirect	 effect	 of	 the	 crisis	 became	 clearly	 visible	 in	 declining	
demand,	largest	pressure	on	profit,	efficiency	and	risk	management.	The	strong	
presence	 of	German	 and	Austrian	 retail	 banks	 in	 the	Czech	Republic	 and	 the	
incorporation	 of	 the	 Prague	 Stock	 Exchange	 into	 the	 Wiener	 Börze	 was	
accompanied	by	an	integration	trend	in	the	capital	markets	as	well.	However,	the	
PSE	did	not	recovered	from	the	financial	crisis,	as	the	total	market	capitalisation	
in	Prague	was	only	a	half	of	its	2007	value.	
Similarly	 to	 Prague,	 the	 development	 of	 financial	markets	 in	Budapest has	
been	 rather	weak,	 reflecting	 the	deteriorating	macroeconomic	 situation,	which	
started	long	before	the	crisis	and	was	chracterised	by	the	lack	of	strategic-minded	
long-term	 economic	 policies	 in	Hungary.	 Starting	 in	 the	 late	 1980s,	 Hungary	
was	a	pioneer	country	for	transition	success,	but	its	badly	designed	and	managed	
fiscal	 and	monetary	 policies	 have	 served	 poorly	 in	 preparing	 it	 for	 the	 global	
economic	crisis	in	2008.	Despite	sustained	rapid	development	continuing	up	to	
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2006,	imbalances	and	negative	trends	have	gained	ground	since	the	beginning	of	
2000s.	Paradoxically,	its	financial	integration,	once	the	engine	of	transition	and	
growth,	 became	 the	 source	 of	 relatively	 large	 accumulated	 private	 and	 public	
debt,	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	 crisis.	Hungary’s	public	debt,	 although	below	 the	
EU	average	level,	had	increased	rapidly,	from	54%	in	2000	to	80%	of	the	GDP	
in	2010.	The	foreign	currency	indebtedness	of	the	private	sector	resulted	in	the	
largest	risk	for	macroeconomic	imbalances.
Although	the	Hungarian	‘gradual’	transition	model	is	characterized	by	some	
degree	of	stability,	at	the	same	time,	foreign	investment	and	takeovers	seem	to	
have	strengthened	the	fundamentals	in	Budapest.	However,	the	lack	of	consistent	
and	long-term	economic	policies	and	the	fiscal	alcoholism	of	serving	governments	
and	weaknesses	of	 regulations	made	 the	Hungarian	financial	markets	unstable	
during	the	crisis,	and	further	weakened	Budapest’s	international	financial	centre	
position.	The	 recent	 right-wing	government’s	campaign	against	 foreign-owned	
banks	 in	Budapest	presented	big	challenges	 to	Budapest’s	ambition	to	become	
an	 international	 financial	 centre.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 foreign	 capital	 inflow	 has	
stabilised	the	Hungarian	economy	and	even	developed	it	to	the	highest	level	in	
the	region	by	2004.	On	the	other	hand,	the	the	Hungarian	banking	system’s	over-
reliance	on	 foreign	capital	made	 the	 risks	of	high	 reverse	capital	flow	evident	
during	the	recent	financial	crisis,	demonstrating	the	dependency	of	Budapest	on	
the	West	European	IFCs	(Mihaljek,	2010).	
The	capital	inflows	to	the	financial	sector	have	recovered	somewhat	since	the	
outbreak	of	the	crisis	in	2008,	and	stock	has	increased	substantially	in	the	Czech	
Republic	 and	Poland,	while	 decreasing	 in	Hungary.	The	 seemingly	 successful	
stabilization	programme	in	Hungary	could	not	take	advantage	of	conter-cyclical	
measures	until	recently,	due	to	the	huge	burden	of	public	and	private	indebtedness	
(the	 transfer	of	 foreign	currency	debt	 to	 local	currency	 that	was	decided	upon	
in	late	2014	could	cost	8%	of	the	GDP).	The	right-wing	government	launched	
a	 major	 re-nationalization	 program	 after	 2010,	 primarily	 in	 the	 energy	 and	
banking	sectors.	It	aims	to	increase	the	domestic/state	share	of	the	banking	sector,	
which	 reached	 more	 than	 50%	 by	 2015	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 purchased	 foreign	
owned	 subsidiaries.	 The	 Hungarian	 government	 heavily	 taxed	 foreign-owned	
banks	in	past	years,	and	therefore	the	Hungarian	financial	market	is	considered	
less	 attractive	 for	 foreign	 financial	 players.	 The	 nationalist	 approach	 strongly	
discourages	 the	 internationalisation	of	Budapest	 as	 a	financial	 centre	and	as	 it	
looks	now,	it	has	left	the	competition	to	become	the	international	financial	centre	
of	CEE	region.	
Conclusions 
The	aim	of	the	present	study	was	to	examine	the	development	of	international	
financial	centre	function	of	Budapest	as	compared	to	Warsaw	and	Prague	during	
the	 transition	 period,	 assessing	 the	 preconditions	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 regional	
centres.	 Various	 data	 used,	 such	 as	 employment	 figures,	 presence	 of	 foreign	
banks,	and	size	of	the	banking	sector	and	capital	markets,	illustrate	the	signs	of	
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financial	centre	formation.	However,	despite	the	significant	growth	in	financial	
sector	employment,	banking	assets,	stock	market	capitalization,	and	cross-border	
capital	flows	since	the	early	1990s,	the	size	of	the	financial	sector	and	the	number	
of	global	players	concentrating	in	these	capital	cities	are	still	much	smaller	than	
their	western	conterparts.	
The	paper	finds	that	despite	the	increasing	integration	of	these	capital	cities	to	
the	network	of	the	West	European	IFCs,	the	external	dependency	of	these	capitals,	
which	appears	in	the	form	of	hierarchical	command	and	control	functions	by	global	
IFCs,	 reinforces	 the	high	 level	of	financial	dependence	of	CEE.	This	prevents	
the	development	of	fully-fledged	financial	centre	functions.	A	key	finding	of	our	
study	 is	 that	 despite	 these	 preconditions,	 carefully	 tailored	 economic	 policies	
combined	with	 city	branding	 strategy	make	 it	 possible	 to	develop	certain	 IFC	
functions	in	each	of	the	three	capital	cities,	providing	significant	benefits	through	
international	 economic	 integration	 and	 networks,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 Warsaw’s	
example,	or	by	the	post-crisis	development	of	Budapest	as	a	counter-example.	
The	paper	argues	that	the	global	crisis	not	only	exposed	the	weaknesses	of	the	
post-socialist	development	model	 in	certain	CEE	countries,	but	 it	has	also	had	
a	significant	 impact	on	 the	future	development	of	IFCs.	Our	analysis	confirms	
that	diversification	is	observable	not	only	at	the	country	level,	but	on	the	level	of	
capital	cities	as	well,	as	their	development	path	also	became	more	differentiated	
as	a	result	of	the	crisis.	Various	data	on	banking	and	capital	markets	illustrates	the	
fluctuation	in	the	concentration	of	IFC	functions.	Despite	there	being	little	market	
evidence	showing	signs	of	a	regional-centre	focus	there	around	the	millennium,	
recently	there	are	more	signs	of	IFC	formation,	especially	considering	the	current	
development	of	Warsaw.	Budapest,	once	a	forerunner	in	economic	transition,	lost	
its	 previous	 competitive	 advantage	 in	 the	financial	 sector	 and	 declined	due	 to	
the	deteriorating	macro-economic	conditions	and	mismanaged	economic	policies	
long	before	the	crisis.	Budapest	has	not	become	a	regional	financial	centre	despite	
its	 favorable	preconditions,	which	 largely	 stemmed	 from	 the	 regional	network	
of	OTP	Bank.	The	 paper	 argues	 that	 regional	 banking	 networks	 alone	 do	 not	
make	a	city	an	international	financial	centre	–	especially	when	capital	markets	
are	concerned.	However,	in	the	case	of	Warsaw,	its	prudent	and	investor-friendly	
economic	policy,	high-standard	of	financial	regulations,	and	active	strategy	in	the	
capital	markets,	made	the	city	the	most	important	IFC	in	CEE.	With	its	global	
presence,	 the	Warsaw	 Stock	 Exchange	 not	 only	 maintained	 its	 independence	
from	Vienna,	but	also	became	the	largest	exchange	in	the	region.	
The	rise	and	fall	of	Budapest	as	a	prominent	regional	financial	centre	can	be	
explained	not	only	by	the	badly	managed	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	prior	to	the	
global	economic	crisis,	but	also	to	a	large	extent	by	the	competition	and	successes	
of	 the	 other	 financial	 centres.	 We	 argue	 that	 besides	 the	 lack	 of	 consistent	
economic	 policies	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 regulations	 that	 made	 the	 Hungarian	
financial	markets	vulnerable	during	the	crisis,	the	recent	nationalist	approaches	
of	the	government	(re-nationalization,	levy	on	banking)	have	further	weakened	
Budapest’s	 international	 position.	 Our	 analysis	 concluded	 that	 Budapest,	
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despite	its	earlier	endeavours,	has	most	likely	lost	the	competition	to	become	an	
international	financial	centre.
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